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# Town Meeting



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BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

BROADCAST BY STATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO.



Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

## What's Behind the Crisis in Indonesia?

*Moderator,* GEORGE V. DENNY, JR.

### *Speakers*

MR. SOEDJATMOKO

JOHN HOOD

JAN BROEK

ROBERT AURA SMITH

*(See also page 12)*

### COMING

January 18, 1949

**Can Modern Capitalism Meet the Needs  
of Modern Man?**

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## THE BROADCAST OF JANUARY 18:

### "Can Modern Capitalism Meet the Needs of Modern Man?"



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BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR



JANUARY 11, 1949

VOL. 14, No. 37

## What's Behind the Crisis in Indonesia?

### Announcer:

It's Town Meeting time again when millions of Americans assemble to consider one of the great issues of the day through the magic of radio. It is estimated by the experts that five to ten million people listen to Town Meeting each week.

Do you know how this came about? Town Meeting listeners from coast-to-coast, in towns and cities, on farms and isolated mining camps throughout the country, listen as individuals and in groups and tell their friends about the programs they have heard and the programs that are to come.

These modern Town Criers have built this great audience by using the modern Town Crier's bell, the telephone, to call their neighbors to Town Meeting. What, after all, is the best guarantee that we will keep our freedom? If we are to make sound decisions in these days of world turmoil, we must first have an informed public opinion. You can help to guarantee an in-

formed public opinion in America by listening regularly to Town Meeting and reminding others to do the same.

Now to preside over tonight's discussion, here is our moderator, the President of Town Hall, and founder of America's Town Meeting, Mr. George V. Denny, Jr. Mr. Denny. (*Applause.*)

### Moderator Denny:

Good evening, neighbors. Tonight we are going to discuss a conflict in a part of the world strange to most of us, yet as close to us as the cigarette you just lighted, the blue shirt you are wearing, and the spices with which your dinner was flavored tonight.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor when the Japanese moved swiftly down the Malay Peninsula and occupied the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, we, here in America, learned the importance of the rubber trees in the East Indies, when tire rationing was suddenly clamped down on us.

These fertile islands, resting

squarely upon the equator, and forming a sort of connecting link between Asia and Australia, are the home of some 70 million people, in a land area about one-fourth the size of the United States. For the past 300 years, they were known as the Dutch East Indies, and are now known as Indonesia.

When the Japanese overran the islands in 1942, they posed as liberators of the Asiatic peoples from white imperialism. After the war, due to the time lag between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of British and Dutch troops, Indonesian nationalism, already growing, grew rapidly, and in August, 1945, the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed and a Nationalist Government under President Soekarno was set up. However, Dutch still claimed sovereignty over the whole area, and sporadic fighting between the Dutch and the Republican troops kept up until November, 1946, when a tentative agreement was reached to cease hostilities.

A renewal of hostilities occurred again in July, 1947, after the Dutch had gained control of a great deal more of the territory there. This came to an end when the United Nations took a hand and negotiated what is known as the *Renville Truce Agreement* of January, 1948.

About three weeks ago, the Dutch authorities, charging the inability of the Republican government to maintain order, used its

armed forces by sea and air to occupy the main towns of the Republic of Indonesia and captured many of the leaders of the Republican government.

Five days after the fighting started, the Security Council of the United Nations ordered both sides to cease fire. Today, at Lake Success, this matter was taken up by the Security Council again.

Now, just what does this conflict mean to us here in America? On January 1, Pandit Nehru, Indian Prime Minister, invited thirteen other nations, most of them Asiatic, to consider the Indonesian problem. What's more, the cry of western imperialism is being raised among the people of Asia, despite the protests of the Dutch government that it seeks only to restore order in Indonesia and is preparing to give the people of Indonesia the benefits of orderly freedom and democracy.

To help us understand this important conflict involving the delicately balanced relationship between the people of the East and West, we have four distinguished authorities, each of whom has intimate knowledge of the history of the situation up to now, and the principles involved.

Our first speaker, Mr. Soedjatmoko, was born in Sumatra in January, 1922. He spent part of his early youth in Holland and attended medical school in Batavia. During the Japanese occupation of his country, he was active in the

underground movement, and after the war was one of the organizers of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia. He's a member of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations and has just returned from Paris.

Mr. Soedjatmoko, will you give us your answer to the question, "What's Behind the Crisis in Indonesia?" Mr. Soedjatmoko. (*Applause.*)

**Mr. Soedjatmoko:**

It is 1776 in Indonesia. The Republic Army is at the Valley Forge of Indonesian history. Our troops are in the mountains, our guerrilla forces are penetrating into the Dutch lines. We are fighting with a firm conviction that justice and democracy and the determined will of the people has always triumphed.

The cowardly attack of Holland came at a moment when the Republic of Indonesia was consulting with the United Nations Good Offices Committee in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Indonesian crisis.

The fact that a solution could be found worried the gentleman from Holland. They were worried because settlement would mean the opening of Indonesia to free world trade.

It would mean the expansion of commercial relations between the United States and the Republic of Indonesia. It would mean the smashing of vicious Dutch cartels

which for 300 years have forced the Indonesian people to sell their valuable products at only a fraction of their real market value. It would mean the unmasking of Dutch hypocrisy. From one corner of the Netherlands' mouth, they proclaim beautiful promises of so-called independence. Out of the other side they try to maintain a stranglehold on the economy of our people. Peace would mean that the native Indonesian producers would sell their products to the United States at a fair price, rather than to Holland.

It would mean a better standard of living. All this would end forever 300 years of terrible exploitation.

You will hear from Dr. Jan Broek and Mr. Robert Smith that the Netherlands Government had ceased considering Indonesia a colony as early as 1921. But what good are words when for the past 28 years these words have camouflaged a regime of brutality, dictatorship, and imperialism?

If the Dutch were really sincere about granting the rightful independence of Indonesia, they would have found in Prime Minister Hatta's generous terms, offered only a few days before their treacherous attack, sufficient grounds for the realization of their alleged goal.

No, the Dutch are not being honest with the people of Indonesia nor with the people of the world. On the one hand, in the

Linggadjati and Renfrew truce agreements, they recognized the de facto sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and guaranteed they would not take overt action. On the other hand, they now attempt to deny that sovereignty and they have taken overt action. They have violated the sensibilities of modern mankind.

They have violated even the minimum standards of human decency in assuring the American Delegation in Paris on December 17—one day before they resumed their colonial war—that they would not consider military action.

They have striven to destroy the United Nations. They have made possible the threat to the world of a break between the peoples of Asia and the Western Union. They have opened ominous avenues for the future of Indonesia and the world.

They have done more, by this one single action, to encourage the growth of communism than any group of Communist agents could have accomplished with all the gold that Moscow could supply.

They cannot stand before a court of public opinion with clean hands. In breaking a solemn truce agreement signed under international auspices and guaranteed by the Security Council, they picked a moment when the leaders of Indonesia were gathered in the President's Palace to discuss the possibilities of peace.

In the face of world criticism

against their renewal of colonial warfare, the Dutch are now renewing their pledges of sovereignty and independence. But their history of broken promises tells us how much these promises mean.

Whenever she found implementation of solemn agreements would endanger the complete domination of Indonesia, they have renounced their agreements and resorted to brutal force. Their's is a history of broken promises. We cannot believe them. (*Applause.*)

#### **Moderator Denny:**

Thank you, Mr. Soedjatmoko. Our next speaker, Dr. Jan O. M. Broek, was born in Utrecht, The Netherlands, where he received his education. He studied in England and various American universities as a Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation and became professor of geography at the University of California in 1936. In 1947, he went to the East Indies at the invitation of the government, and, last September, he returned to America to assume his new position as Chairman of the Department of Geography at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Broek has been an American citizen since 1941.

Dr. Broek, we understand you do not exactly share the views of Mr. Soedjatmoko. What are yours? Mr. Broek. (*Applause.*)

#### **Dr. Broek:**

America was born of a revolt against a colonial status. No won-

der Americans have an aversion to colonies. Anybody attacking colonial policy and advocating freedom, Mr. Soedjatmoko, is sure to find a sympathetic audience.

The question is, however, first, is the Netherlands really fighting the Indonesians, and secondly, is it trying to re-establish a colonial regime? If that is not the case, the emotional outbursts are misdirected.

First, I want you to understand the difference between Indonesia and the Republic. Indonesia and the official name of what was formally called the Netherlands Indies. Fifty million people, or two-thirds of the total population, belong to the new emerging Federation, working in partnership with the Dutch toward establishing a sovereign United States of Indonesia within the shortest time possible.

This Indonesian Federation, consisting of a dozen states, on the principle that the great variety of peoples and cultures each must have the right of self-government in local matters—I say this Indonesian Federation, it is expected, will join the Netherlands as an equal, sovereign, partner in a Netherlands-Indonesian union.

In the past three years, there has been a rapid transfer of authority from Dutch to Indonesian officials and organs. Also, these federal territories are well on their way toward economic recovery, for

a good deal thanks to American aid.

On the other hand, the Indonesian Republic, although it tries to maintain abroad the fiction that it is The Government of all Indonesia, actually controls only one-fourth of Java and four-fifths of sparsely populated Sumatra. Its population was about 25 million or one-third of the total.

Yet, a house divided against itself cannot stand. As long as the Republic refused to cooperate, the structure of a federation could not be completed. The Republic, first, two years ago, at Linggadjati, and then a year later aboard the U.S. Renville, accepted certain broad principles of a political settlement, as did other Indonesian leaders and the Dutch. These agreements affirmed Netherlands sovereignty in Indonesia for a brief interim period, during which preparations for an independent Indonesian Federation were to be made. The Republican Government, however, has been either unwilling or unable to carry out her pledges. For instance, various parties in the Republic insisted that this Dutch sovereignty should not apply to the Republic's armed forces nor to its foreign relations. Furthermore the Republic was not willing or able to stop continuous violations of the truce.

Then, after long and patient negotiations led to no result whatever, the Dutch undertook to intervene. This action will give a

chance to the moderate elements within the Republic to express themselves. And I am sure that they will, like elsewhere in Indonesia, take constructive action toward a rapid realization of the common goal, an independent Indonesia, forming with the Netherlands a voluntary union.

These are not phrases. Everybody knows that Western colonialism in Southeast Asia is dead, never to return. The process of history allows no turning back of the hands of the clock. The Dutch know this as well as the Americans.

But independence is not enough, Mr. Soedjatmoko! There must also be a responsible government, order, and a certain maturity of institutions. Otherwise a vacuum is created in which Western colonial rule is merely replaced by that of another outside force. The Dutch are trying to create such a responsible and, moreover, a democratic government before they leave. That is their duty. Many Americans at the present doubt the wisdom of their action. Yet, looking at South and East Asia as a whole, and considering its future in relation to our own ideals and interests, I believe that some years hence Americans will show more understanding for what the Dutch have done. (*Applause.*)

#### **Moderator Denny:**

Thank you, Dr. Broek. Our next speaker arrived in this country

last night on the Queen Mary to take up his position as Minister of the Australian Mission to the United Nations and member of the Australian Department of External affairs. John Douglas Lloyd Hood was born in South Australia, was educated at Hobart University and was a Rhodes Scholar to Oxford in 1926. After seven years on the editorial staff of the London Times he entered the service of his government where he has been ever since. He was a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 and for the second and third sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Dr. Hood, may we have your views on tonight's question? (*Applause.*)

#### **Mr. Hood:**

I am afraid Mr. Broek has oversimplified this question. For Australia it is a vital question with implications over a vast area of the part of the world in which we live. Our interest is just as close as that of a householder whose next door neighbor's property is threatened with a disastrous conflagration. What has happened in Indonesia in the past three years and what may happen there in the next few months of even weeks may affect our security and our prospects for generations to come. We cannot stand aside in helping to prevent that conflagration on the basis of fair play and a realistic appreciation of the deep political and human factors involved.

What is the present position? For over a year, under U.N. auspices, spasmodic negotiations have been proceeding in Indonesia towards a peaceful settlement of the problems involved in the emergence of a new international entity, the United States of Indonesia. As an eventual part, and the most important part of this intended federation, the Dutch, and a number of other countries, including my own and the United States, had recognized as an instrument both of negotiation and government, the Republic of Indonesia. It is true to say that all interested parties recognized that without the cooperation of the Republic the chances of success for the new Government of the Netherlands East Indies would be slight.

We have heard a lot of talk of alleged distrust of the Republican Government. Some Netherlands representatives have gone so far as to claim that its liquidation would be greeted with relief throughout the area. In my view this is completely false. The Republican Government commanded, and still does command, the loyal support of the majority of the peoples of the whole of Indonesia. The consequence of Dutch action against the Republic may well be of an extreme nature desired least of all by the Dutch.

The burden of Mr. Broek's complaint against the Republic may be summarized as intransigent refusal

to consider reasonable offers, and an inability to enforce agreements once reached. This is the Dutch side of the picture. The Republic has claimed to have made concessions as far as it could possibly go, and to have abided loyally by its undertakings. The answer of the U.N. Committee of Good Offices to this is crystal clear. First, they agree that the Republic has gone as far as can be expected, even to the recognition of Dutch sovereignty over it for the time being. The Republic asked only for the exercise by the Dutch of restraint in the exercise of this sovereignty. As to the Dutch present demands, the same Committee has gone on record to the effect that acceptance by the Republic would have "constituted complete surrender to all major Dutch demands."

These are the circumstances in which the Dutch claimed that their patience was exhausted and that they had only the alternatives of giving in completely to the Republic or in liquidating it. As the U.N. Committee of Good Offices has pointed out, was there not another alternative to bloodshed and violence, and the open violation of both an agreement with the Republic and an order of the U.N.? Surely a sincere effort at negotiation through the U.N. was the *real* alternative.

Claims that the so-called "police action" was designed to promote conditions in which a democratic regime can be set up are empty

when the methods of producing these conditions produce reactions of bitterness and resistance which must defeat the ostensible purposes of the action. For this is what the Dutch have done. They have made the continued existence of a moderate government capable in the long run of stable administration impossible, they have defied the efforts of the U.N. to assist, and, for all their claims, they have used the outmoded instruments of colonization to force their own solution of the problem on an unwilling people.

We in Australia fear that the results of the Dutch action may be years of uneasy hostility in the area, and of justifiable distrust of the East as to the objectives of the West in the whole of South-East Asia, leaving to the eventual emergence of just those conditions in which the extremist elements may seize power, with chaotic results.

We believe that all this could have been avoided by the Dutch, and we are looking with great hope to the adoption of methods by which the co-operation of the Indonesians in their own future, rather than a sullen and rebellious acquiescence in dictated policies, may be achieved.

#### **Moderator Denny:**

Thank you, Dr. Hood. Our next speaker is also a Rhodes scholar from the State of Ohio who turned to journalism after receiving his degree from Oxford. Instead of the *London Times*, however, he

landed with the *New York Times* where he is a specialist in far Eastern affairs due to his extensive experience in nearly every country of Eastern Asia, during and after World War II. His views, of course, are not necessarily those of the *New York Times*. Robert Aura Smith, we are glad to have you back on Town Meeting. Mr. Smith. (*Applause.*)

#### **Mr. Smith:**

Thank you, Mr. Denny. Our problem here tonight on Town Meeting as phrased in our topic is "What's Behind the Crisis in Indonesia?" I think we have seen some illustration right here tonight of some of the things that are behind the crisis in the difference of opinions that have been expressed.

There is first of all a complete difference of opinion in regard to the time element. Mr. Soedjatmoko says it is 1776 in Indonesia, the beginning of a war. Dr. Broek says, "Wait a minute. It is 1789 in Indonesia, the beginning of a formation of a federal union."

The trouble is that in this case now we have what would correspond to the State of Virginia saying, "Yes, we will form a federal union, but you have to recognize our sovereignty here in Virginia over New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland, and both Carolinas. So there is a very great difference of opinion as to which year it is.

Now, there's another time ele-

ment. There is a time element here in conflict as to what things really come first. It has been the Dutch position right along that after these years of war and Japanese occupation and devastation that the first thing that had to be done was to get peace and law and order and stability and productivity not only for the sake of the Netherlands, but for the sake of Indonesia and for the sake of world recovery as a whole. That's the first step.

Now, the Dutch said, concurrently with that, "We will go right ahead and make great political changes. We have already outlined them and those changes include full self-government, not merely for the Republic of Indonesia, but for every Indonesian—those 50 million outside the Republic."

The Republic, on the other hand, says, "No, we don't think that is the right procedure. We think that political changes ought to come first. You recognize our sovereignty over very large areas some of which we never actually controlled, and that after that peace and law and order and productivity can, or at least ought to, take care of themselves."

So, there is a basic conflict there in what comes first.

Now, a second conflict has also been expressed here in the difference between Mr. Soedjatmoko and Dr. Broek. That is on the ability of the government to abide by the

commitments and enforce the commitments that it makes. The Dutch, with a good deal of difficulty, have arrived at uniformed policy in respect to Indonesia. They can make their commitments good.

The Republic has been obliged to confess that it could not make its commitments good. Premier Hatta has had to explain to that Good Offices Committee that he couldn't actually guarantee that the Government that he represents would carry out his commitments just as Prime Minister Sjahrir had said the same thing before him.

The practical inability of that Government to enforce its commitments is amply demonstrated by the fact that in this very Renville Truce, in the first year, there were 750 Indonesians killed by other Indonesians in the 65 recorded Republic violations of the truce agreement.

We have heard a lot about the Dutch violations. It was one big spectacular movement. We did not hear anything about the little piecemeal violations that went along all the time.

So, now you have got these two conflicts and ideas. To resolve these conflicts the Dutch have resorted to direct action and that direct action is condemned by the Indonesians. It is condemned by other Asiatics. It is condemned, I think, by all of us. It is deplored by the United Nations. It is profoundly regretted by the Dutch themselves, because they realize

that force does not beget force and that this particular action may breed other forceful actions unless some speedy and just compromise is very quickly reached.

It is my conviction, however, after watching the evolution of some other states that are making changes, such as the Philippines, for example, where I lived for a number of years, that the Indonesians can proceed more securely and more rapidly toward the real self-government that has been promised for them with Dutch assistance than without it.

I believe that the history of other colonial peoples who have made the change will demonstrate that. To represent this particular thing, at the moment, as a conflict be-

tween imperialism and freedom, the old-style colonial war, and so on, is simply to drag in a lot of weighted words to generate heat instead of to shed light. Thank you. (*Applause.*)

**Moderator Denny:**

Thank you, Robert Aura Smith. Now, gentlemen, if you will join me up here around the microphone we will have a little further discussion and see just where we do stand because I am sure that you have succeeded in confusing a great many people. Mr. Soedjatmoko, we have not heard from you for a little while.

**Mr. Soedjatmoko:** I think that it is of great importance that one important essential matter should be mentioned. It is true that a

## THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

**MR. SOEDJATMOKO** — Mr. Soedjatmoko is a member of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations and has just returned to the United States from Paris. He is former chief of the Foreign Section of the Indonesian Republican Information Ministry and editor of the political weekly *Siassat*.

**ROBERT AURA SMITH** — Newspaperman and author, Mr. Smith was born in Denver, Colorado, in 1899. With an A.B. from Ohio Wesleyan University, he went to Oxford University for his M.A. He was also a Rhodes scholar. He taught English for short periods at Drake University and at Evansville College. In 1925, he joined the editorial staff of the *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune* where he wrote during the next four years, and was simultaneously a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Going to the Philippines in 1930, Mr. Smith served as news editor of the *Manila Daily Bulletin* until 1937. He was also staff correspondent for the *New York Times*. From 1937 to 1941, he

was on the cable desk of the *Times*, and since 1945 has been in the Foreign News Department.

During 1942-43, Mr. Smith was with O.W.I. in India, and during 1944-45, in New York. During World War I, he served with the A.E.F. and in 1934, was a second lieutenant with Military Intelligence.

In addition to his newswriting, Mr. Smith is the author of *Our Future in Asia*, *Your Foreign Policy*, and *Divided India*.

**JAN O. M. BROEK** — Dr. Broek is a professor and chairman of the geography department at the University of Minnesota. He spent four months of last year in Java where he was invited by the Netherlands Government of the Indies to help reorganize the University of Indonesia at Batavia.

**JOHN HOOD** — Mr. Hood is Minister of the Australian Mission to the United Nations and a member of the Australian Department of External Affairs.

federation of states in Indonesia was envisaged in the agreement we signed with the Dutch, but that federation was to come into being as a consequence of negotiation. Instead of negotiating, the Dutch circumvented the Good Offices Committee which was set up for the very purpose to bring that solution. Now, after this military action, the Dutch quickly proclaimed that they are continuing their policy of giving freedom to the Republic—the whole of Indonesia. If that were so, then one thing could not be explained, why in the face of such a continuation of policy the Good Offices Committee may tender its resignation or at least ask the Security Council to consider its resignation, with these words: "The Committee feels a deep and abiding concern for the welfare of Indonesia. It does not, however, wish to be put in a position of seeming to approve by its participation, or even its authentication, any settlement based on force rather than through negotiation."

**Moderator Denny:** Thank you. Perhaps we'd better ask Mr. Broek to comment on that. Mr. Broek.

**Mr. Broek:** Yes, I'd like to say something on that. I don't quite see the point which is being made at the moment by Mr. Soedjatmoko. It seems to me that the idea was that a Federation was going to be formed and the Republic, in those principles agreed upon by

the Renville agreement, said that she agreed on that matter.

Now, if then the Republic itself opposes, or at least makes very difficult—I would say almost sabotages—this kind of new system, and, please notice this, the other areas of Indonesia, who are quite anxious to get self-government, say "You must go ahead," to the Dutch, "we must go ahead even if the Republic doesn't want to."

I think it is quite clear that, under the circumstances, the Federation was set up with, all the time, the door being kept open for the Republic to come in any time, any time, they were ready to come in.

I would like to quote to you, if I have a minute, a statement by the Prime Minister of the State of East Indonesia who says this on July 30, 1948. He said, "We want cooperation with the Republic, our base is the same, our goal equally directed toward confirmation of Indonesian nationalism. There is only a difference in point of view of the road and methods to be followed. We have chosen the road of deliberation and legality, of a gradual development, which at the same time is as rapid as possible."

On that basis the other states have pushed the Dutch to agree on having conference after conference to build up this Federation as fast as possible.

I think, under the circumstances, it would have been very, very dumb, very stupid, and not correct to give the other states the chance

of organizing while the Republic was still, shall we say, at least hesitating, although actually obstructing. (*Applause.*)

**Moderator Denny:** Thank you. Mr. Hood?

**Mr. Hood:** The particular slant I'd like to give at this point to the question is something slightly different from what Mr. Broek has just touched on. It is this: My particular job, at the moment, happens to be what is called politics, that is to say the art of trying to get things done if you can, and I look at this question from the point of view of one very modest person who, with a great many other more able people, is at the moment concerned in seeing what can be done to bring about a satisfactory settlement to this business in Indonesia.

My complaint against the Netherlands, represented here by the distinguished person of Mr. Broek, is that they have not in fact tried sincerely to use the machinery which is at the disposal of themselves and of anybody else under the organization known as the United Nations. And I'd like to ask Mr. Broek this question which I hope he'll be able to answer presently if there's an opportunity. That is this: Why was it that at the very last moment. . . . (*laughter*)

**Moderator Denny:** I am just suggesting to Mr. Hood, that he not emphasize his point by hammering on the desk as you might

break a tube and then 260 stations can't hear this program. Go ahead, Mr. Hood, carry on. I didn't mean to be pulling you away from the microphone just to stop you from hammering on the desk.

**Mr. Hood:** My question is merely this to Mr. Broek. Until the day before in which the military action in Indonesia was undertaken last month, every show was made by the business authorities of Indonesia of using the Committee of Good Offices. No mention was made, no hint was given, of forceful action outside the limits of the agreement which had been reached, and the Netherlands authorities in Indonesia, permitted in fact, the Republic a margin of only 18 hours—I think that was the correct time—to answer the formal communication from the Netherlands authorities. I asked Mr. Broek if he would care to explain to us how he can reconcile that with his statement that every process of negotiation was exhausted?

**Moderator Denny:** Thank you. Mr. Robert Aura Smith's going to take over for Mr. Broek on that.

**Mr. Smith:** I think that perhaps Mr. Hood has left a little misapprehension by saying that there was 18 hours here, and then, suddenly, a blitzkrieg and so on. He's overlooked one thing that happened there. This action took place on the 18th of December, but on the 11th of December, that same Good Offices Committee got

a formal communique from the Dutch Government saying that negotiations had been exhausted and that other steps would have to be taken.

They were exhausted in the period of eleven months of trying to get some responsible person to make a responsible commitment. The Dutch even went so far as to send out the highest ranking Cabinet Mission they could get including their Foreign Minister. They have got the Premier out there right now, trying to get a settlement. So when you say there was no attempt to make a settlement you're oversimplifying, and when Mr. Hood pictures a very sudden action without warning, he overlooks a communique that was issued eight days before any action was taken. (*Applause.*)

**Moderator Denny:** Thank you. Now there are a great many people here ready to ask questions. While we get ready for our questions period, I'm sure that you, our listeners will be interested in the following message.

**Announcer:** This is the 542nd broadcast of America's Town Meeting, the nation's most popular radio and television forum, originating in Town Hall, just off Times Square, in New York. We are discussing the vital question "What's Behind the Crisis in Indonesia?" On our panel are Mr. Soedjatmoko, Dr. Jan Broek, John Douglas Lloyd Hood, and Rob-

ert Aura Smith. You will hear questions from the audience in just a moment.

The complete text of every Town Meeting is published in the Town Meeting Bulletin which you may obtain by writing to Town Hall, New York 18, New York, enclosing ten cents to cover the cost of printing and mailing. You should allow at least two weeks for delivery. The yearly subscription rate at \$4.50, six months for \$2.35. A trial subscription of eleven issues is \$1.00. Many previous programs are still in print and you may write for copies of Town Meetings which you may have missed.

We want to urge your attention to the deadly menace of tuberculosis which claims nearly fifty thousand victims each year—one every ten minutes. Tuberculosis leads all diseases as the cause of death between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four. But tuberculosis is curable; the disease can be wiped out but only with your help.

If you or any of your family have any of the symptoms of tuberculosis, have a physical examination at once. In many places you can get a chest x-ray free of charge or at nominal cost through your local tuberculosis association or Health Department. But act promptly. Don't delay. Now for our question period, we return you to Mr. Denny.

# QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

*Mr. Denny:* Now we're ready for our question period here in Town Hall. We'll start with the gentleman over here in the fifth row.

*Man:* Mr. Soedjatmoko. On your statement "opening world trade"—formerly import duty Indonesian identical all origins, including Dutch. Now Republic gives monopoly Fox Concern 5% commission all import U. S. A. Please explain. (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Mr. Soedjatmoko, I think that was about 25 words.

*Mr. Soedjatmoko:* It is the policy of my government to open our country for international trade—not directed to one country only, not directed to Holland only as it was in the past, not directed to the United States only.

The basic idea underlying this policy is one that the needs of the world and our own needs, will be best served by opening up the trade for all countries.

In the particular contract, the honorable gentleman is referring to, I think he is laboring under a slight misapprehension. In this contract there is no question of monopoly. It is only one of the purchasing agencies of the Republican Government of which there are several others in other countries.

*Mr. Denny:* Any further comments? Then we'll take the lady here.

*Lady:* Mr. Broek. Since colonial-

ism is dead in southeastern Asia, why do the Dutch assume complete right to intervene in Indonesian affairs?

*Mr. Broek:* Yes, I think that is very simple to answer. The Dutch are not intervening in Indonesia. The Dutch have sovereignty in the interim period which has been recognized also by the Indonesian Republic. So at this moment, as it is, they have the complete right that if, after all, a fraction of Indonesia does not in any way cooperate in the new structure, then they have the right to take measures there, if they think that is to the benefit of the whole of Indonesia.

*Mr. Denny:* The gentleman on the aisle.

*Man:* Mr. Hood. Australia, with a white policy, supports Soekarno, appointed by Japan and not the Indonesian Federalists working for an independent United States of Indonesia representing the majority of Indonesians. Why?

*Mr. Hood:* Well, sir, if I understood the question correctly, it has nothing, in my estimation, to do with white Australia. Our interest in the Indonesian question derives from the realization that nationalist movements throughout the whole of the Eastern world, particularly in southeastern Asia, are a present vital historical reality. We only invite delusion and chaos if the countries concerned

attempt to ignore the strength of those movements. That is the basis of our case. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. The gentleman over here, please.

*Man:* Mr. Smith. It took us quite some time to win our fight for freedom, and I'd like to know why you don't give the Indonesians the same opportunity? (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Smith:* The questioner says it took us a long time to win our freedom; why can't the Indonesians have the same opportunity? That's precisely what we're suggesting, that it will take a long time, that you are not going to do it day after tomorrow. It has to be done through law and orderly evolution and not through a revolution of the character that's going on. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. The lady in the aisle, please.

*Lady:* The question is directed to Mr. Soedjatmoko.

*Mr. Denny:* Yes. Mr. Soedjatmoko, will you come up?

*Lady:* How does the Republic expect to compensate the Dutch for their miraculous development of the Dutch East Indies, their engineering triumphs, their agricultural projects and their wonderful health measures? (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Soedjatmoko:* I think we have to get one thing straight first, That is that any measures undertaken by the Dutch Colonial government in Indonesia was not, in the first place, done for the bene-

fit of the Indies, but to develop channels through which the exploitation of the countries could go easier. I agree, that the small number of services which are existing in Indonesia due to the Dutch rule are quite good in quality, but the number is criminally low. If one considers that after 300 years, seven per cent of the population are able to read and write, that in the whole of Indonesia a thousand doctors are available for a population of seventy million—that is not a good health service. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. Mr. Broek has a comment on that question.

*Mr. Broek:* I really can't let that pass. There is something that should be said on that matter. Now, don't misunderstand me. I'm not going to say the Dutch went there 300 years ago and remained there 300 years just for the benefit of these poor Indonesians. But let us say this: While they, of course, went there for their own benefit, in spite of that, or I would say, since at least 1900, with that purpose also included, they did perform services.

Let us just get a moment away from Indonesia. Let's think a moment of my own forefathers and many of you. Let's think of the Roman empire. The Romans didn't come to my country, the Netherlands where I was born, just to help those poor Batavians. They came, I'm sure, to get some-

thing out of it, although I wonder what they could get out of that. They got there and I'm sure they exploited my forefathers and yet they did bring there, shall we say that old Mediterranean civilization, Roman law, roads, administrative system, Christianity, and anybody will admit that whatever the Romans did that were bad things, they did after all, do a lot of good things, too.

Now, in that spirit, I like to look at this matter. I'm not saying, in other words, that the Dutch did everything right, but look at both sides, please. To give you an example of what I mean. One speaks here about a few services. But please remember, think of such things as rubber, and quinine, and I could mention several other products, to mention another aspect of it. They were not there and Indonesians didn't have them there. The Dutch brought them in, the Dutch developed them out of South America. In other words, it was working together, with Indonesian labor. I will say, perhaps, Indonesia didn't get enough of that power; power always leads to abuse. Of course, but let's not do as if the Dutch were simply taking the existing riches out of Indonesia. If I may say a word on this seven per cent of illiteracy, that is an old, old gag, and I want to say something on it, if I have one minute. Later? All right.

*Mr. Denny:* Yes, a little later.

*Mr. Broek:* All right. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Question from the gentleman there in the center aisle. Face this way, please.

*Man:* Question for Mr. Smith. Do you believe that we should be interested to reinstate an economical system that permitted less than one per cent of the children be sent to school because the parents didn't earn enough?

*Mr. Smith:* The question is should we permit the reinstatement of a system that has very grave abuses. I don't think it's an issue. No, certainly not. Who's suggesting that that thing is going to be reinstated? What we're suggesting is that we're going to make some progress now. We want to have a chance to make real progress toward real freedom. Nobody is suggesting going back to the Middle Ages. We're going on to a much better day for Indonesia. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* I see Mr. J. J. Singh down there on the aisle. Mr. Singh, do you have a question for someone?

*Mr. Singh:* Dr. Broek. Is it not a fact that without the American taxpayers' money, which the Netherlands receives through the Marshall Plan, the Netherlands economy would be shattered? If so, then why are the Dutch business men showing their ingratitude to their American benefactors by monopolizing all export trade

from the United States to Indonesia?

*Dr. Broeck:* Yes, now that's a very interesting question. (*Laughter.*) I thought we were talking here about what is behind the crisis in Indonesia. If I understand Mr. Singh correctly, if this is behind the crisis in Indonesia, then it seems to me, if it is true what he says, that American businessmen are very mad about it, and that's perhaps why the uproar. Is that what you mean that the uproar is because American businessmen don't get what they should get?

*Mr. Singh:* You are protecting these monopolists.

*Dr. Broeck:* Well, don't say it to me. (*Applause.*) May I finish up that matter?

*Mr. Denny:* Yes.

*Mr. Broeck:* Monopoly never has existed in the Indies. (*Shouts.*) Look, I will prove that to you in a very simple way. You've not insulted me. I just can say a few words on the matter and it's very simple to say so. What you call monopoly—if I tell you that the capital invested in the Indies before the war was private capital; it was about three and a half billion guilders. Less than two-thirds of that was Dutch. Now you can't call that just a monopoly.

On the east coast of Sumatra, 54 per cent of the private capital invested was Dutch.

Then look at the matter of petroleum on that new possibility

of New Guinea. Do you know that 60 per cent of the capital of that new petroleum company was U.S. owned, and 40 per cent Dutch and English. So who's talking about the monopolies here? A moment ago we heard about Mr. Fox who has gotten from the Republic—a citizen understand and not a country but one citizen—who got from the Republic a right to sell everything they had to sell, which by the way wasn't theirs, but what they call "foreign plantations."

Now if you talk about monopoly, then I would say, in the first place, that the Dutch East Indies never was a monopoly and, certainly, the Republic is trying to establish itself a monopoly. That is my answer, only I really don't understand your question, because I can see that, at present, under very special conditions, every country is keeping control over imports and exports. But that is not a matter of monopoly of a normal situation.

Think of all the American capital invested in the Indies after the war. That indicates that America gets all the chance and the Dutch have been asking for it. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. Gentleman on the aisle over here.

*Man:* I want to ask something of Mr. Hood. I, myself, am an Indonesian. I'm from the federalistic part of Indonesia. Can you tell me why during the Security Coun-

cil session of 1947, Russia voted down the participation of the Indonesian Federalists?

*Mr. Hood:* Participation in what?

*Man:* Any talks about the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.

*Mr. Denny:* Why Russia did what?

*Man:* Why you voted down the participation of the Indonesian Federalists who came over to the United States?

*Mr. Denny:* Why you—did you say why you, meaning Australia?

*Man:* No, why Russia—why Russia? (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Hood:* I'm speaking for Australia, at the moment. (*Laughter.*)

*Mr. Denny:* He can't tell us why Russia did what she did. All right. (*Applause.*) I can't blame him for dodging that question. All right. Yes, do you want to comment, Mr. Broek?

*Mr. Broek:* Yes. (*Laughter.*) You understand I am not speaking for Russia, but I think the question is just too important to drop at that, and I think it should be underlined. That really did cause an amazing thing. The Federalists representatives did travel to the United Nations meeting and simply, because of reasons which I will not discuss, they were not admitted because they were voted down as the speaker said.

Now I think that is a remarkable fact and we should keep that in mind. There really was something why the Republic was being

pushed so hard on the one side and why, on the other, the Federalists side of the Indonesians was not being recognized—a very queer thing indeed. And I'll leave it at that. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. Maybe Mr. Soedjatmoko has a comment on that.

*Mr. Soedjatmoko:* The reason why these Federalists were not accepted by the Security Council is pure and simple. That is that the Security Council does not want to deal with stooges. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. The young lady's question. Let's see if we have time for it.

*Lady:* My question is for Mr. Smith. He mentioned that a compromise would be a perfect solution. What would you suggest between the Indonesians and the Dutch?

*Mr. Smith:* The compromise that I would suggest today is one that was taken up this afternoon in the Security Council by the Chinese delegate, who suggested that there be negotiations reopened immediately to establish a basis for bringing the Indonesians and the Dutch together to get the Republic into a United States off Indonesia and go ahead and do business with them. I think that's the thing to be done.

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. Now, while our speakers prepare their summaries of tonight's question, here's a special message of interest to you.

*Announcer:* After each Town Meeting and Town Hall lecture, someone nearly always approaches our moderator, Mr. Denny, with the question "But what can I do about this?" To answer this question Mr. Denny has prepared a brief, twelve-point pamphlet which tells you simply and practically what you can do to be an active citizen in this democracy and how you can help this nation meet its responsibilities to the world.

Last week we received a request from a national organization for prices on large quantities of this pamphlet. In case there are others of like mind, we want you to know that this pamphlet is available at considerably reduced cost in larger quantities. For instance, for orders of 1,000 or more the cost is only 5½ cents a copy.

For single copies, the price is 10c to cover the cost of printing and mailing. If you would like a single copy or information about larger quantities, ask for Mr. Denny's pamphlet, *What Can You Do?* and send your request to Town Hall, New York 18, New York.

Now for the summaries of tonight's discussion, here is Mr. Denny.

*Mr. Denny:* Now our first summary from Robert Smith.

*Mr. Smith:* I think here tonight we don't have a conflict in ultimate aims. We don't have a conflict in the things that we think

are ultimately good. We do have a conflict of opinion over methods. The immediate method is the thing that is in trouble.

One of those methods was a truce that has been broken by both sides. I think that what we have to do is to stick to the long-range aim and solve the problem of the immediate clash.

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you, Mr. Hood, your summary, please.

*Mr. Hood:* Mr. Denny. I agree with Mr. Smith to this extent that the objective, the main objective, is fairly clearly defined. It is the creation of a new political organization in that part of the Pacific Ocean known as Indonesia, the new state to be known as a federal United States of Indonesia. The whole issue is how is that to be done. The United Nations through its earlier resolutions and decisions on the subject laid it down that the Republic was to be treated as an equal partner. How have the Dutch treated the Republic? I maintain not as an equal partner, but as an inferior party to the negotiations. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. And now Mr. Broek.

*Mr. Broek:* There is a kind of fruit in the Indies—as a matter of fact all of southeast Asia—which has the most terrible smell, you know, but the inside of it, if you eat it, at least a number of people think it is just heavenly. There are a number of other people

who will say it is, after all, rather attractive. Would you look at it in that way, at that matter of the Dutch attack on the Republic? It has created a terrible smell, shall I say. (*Applause.*) But, I would say, please do just get through this emotional side and look on the inside of it. It is a crisis of confidence. Give the Dutch, a democratic people, a little confidence.

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you. *Mr. Soedjatmoko.*

*Mr. Soedjatmoko:* The record of the American people bears out its fundamental ability to stand up against any threat to the democratic way of life. The American people will be able to see through the superficial complexities, at the sophisms which are an insult to the intelligence of the Security Council and the intelligence of the common man, with which the Dutch are covering up their reach for power in Indonesia.

We hope the American people, realizing the real issues at stake, will stop this modernized colonial war, thereby strengthening the United Nations and preserving de-

mocracy and human dignity throughout the world. (*Applause.*)

*Mr. Denny:* Thank you, *Mr. Soedjatmoko, Mr. Broek, Mr. Smith, Mr. Hood,* and each of you for helping us understand a very complicated subject. Remember, friends, if you want a copy of tonight's program, complete with questions and answers, send your request to Town Hall, New York 18, New York, and a copy of the Town Meeting Bulletin will be sent to you if you enclose ten cents to cover the cost of printing and mailing.

Now next week our program will be on the subject "Can Modern Capitalism Meet the Needs of Modern Man?" Our speakers will be William L. Batt, president of SKF Industries; Norman Thomas, Socialist Party leader; Michael Straight, editor of the *New Republic*; and a popular social philosopher, creator of Li'l Abner and those fascinating symbols of abundance, the Shmoo, Mr. A. Capp. So plan to be with us next week and every week at this same time at the sound of the crier's bell. (*Applause.*)